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Abstract
This paper reviews the empirical evidence on commercial media bias (i.e.,
advertisers influence over news reports) and then introduces a simple model
to summarize the main elements of the theoretical literature. The analysis
provides three main policy insights for media regulators: i) Media regula-
tors should target their monitoring efforts towards news contents upon which
advertisers are likely to share similar preferences; ii) In advertising indus-
tries characterized by highly correlated products, an increase in the degree
of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of news reports; iii) A
sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news may drive out
commercial media bias.
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1 Introduction
Media outlets represent archetypal platforms of a two-sided market (Anderson and
Gabszewicz 2006; Armstrong 2006). On one side, they offer entertainment and
information to their viewers. On the other side, they allow advertisers to reach
potential customers. For many types of media outlets, such as commercial TV,
free online newspapers, blogs, radio, free-dailies, advertising represents the unique
source of revenues. Moreover, even media outlets that are not purely adverting-
funded (e.g., newspapers, magazine), greatly rely on advertising revenues to remain
profitable. In the US, 50% to 80% of newspapers revenues come from advertising.
In Europe this percentage goes from 30% to 80% (Baker 1994, Gabszewicz et al.
2001, Ellman and Germano 2009). The following graph shows, for OECD countries,
the average percentage of ads and sales revenues of daily newspapers in 2008.
Figure 1. Contribution of advertising and sales to daily newspapers revenues
(source: OECD 2010)
The fact that almost all media outlets need advertisers to survive has raised concerns
on the possibility of advertisers creating distortions in media contents (Baker, 1994;
Bagdikian, 2004; Hamilton, 2004). Indeed, there is a crucial feature that makes
the relationship between media and advertisers go well beyond the simple sales of
viewers “eye-balls” (Hamilton 2004). That is, the value that an advertiser attaches
to a media outlet may not simply consist on how many viewers it may reach trough
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that outlet. Such a value depends also on the non-advertising contents provided
by the media outlet. Advertisers typically care about the media contents since
they value the characteristics of media viewers (e.g., demographics). In the context
of “target advertising” (e.g., Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2002; George and Waldfogel,
2003; Hamilton, 2004; Stro¨mberg, 2004; Gal-Or et al., 2010; Bergemann and Bonatti
2010) this may create distortions since advertisers may want, for example, news
contents to cover only issues preferred/relevant to large groups (Gabszewicz et al.,
2001, 2002; Stro¨mberg, 2004). At the same time, since media information contents
typically concern also consumer products, advertisers may value the information
content of news media since this may influence the demand for their products.
That is, advertisers may want media to produce favorable news reports (e.g., hide
any negative information concerning their products). Thus, advertisers’ pressure
may create a bias in media news reports.1
The economic literature on media bias has been mainly focused on the bias in
the informative contents of political news reports. Specifically, it has shown that
there may be a “supply-driven” political media bias deriving from the idiosyncratic
preferences of journalists (Baron, 2006), owners (Djankov et al., 2003; Anderson and
McLaren, 2010), governments (Besley and Prat, 2006) or lobbies (Sobbrio, 2010;
Petrova, 2011). Moreover, the endogenous demand of politically “slanted” news
by viewers may result in a “demand-driven” bias in news reports (Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Chan and Suen, 2008; Sobbrio,
2011). While the literature has been trying to address the sources and the welfare
implications of political media bias, less attention has been devoted to analyze the
advertisers-induced distortions in the informative contents of media outlets, i.e., to
commercial media bias (Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2010).
This paper provides a survey of the anecdotal evidence on the presence of commer-
cial media bias within specific industries and of the empirical literature looking at
the link between advertising and media accuracy. At the same time, we introduce
1There are also other types of distortions related to advertising. Armstrong and Weeds (2007)
show that, due to the disutility of advertising, the welfare associated with advertising-funded
media is lower than the one arising in presence of other funding schemes (i.e., public broadcasting).
Moreover, advertising may distort downward the quality chosen by media platforms (Roger, 2010).
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a simple model to review and summarizes the main elements of the theoretical lit-
erature (Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2010; Blasco, Pin and
Sobbrio, 2011). The model provides insights on the main features of the link between
competition in the market for products and commercial media bias. Moreover, the
model also analyzes the role of competition in the market for news. The theoretical
analysis leads to three main policy insights for media regulators. Specifically, the
model suggests that:
1. Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news con-
tents/issues upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences.
2. In advertising industries characterized by highly correlated products, an in-
crease in the degree of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of
news reports.
3. A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news may drive
out commercial media bias.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the anecdotal and empiri-
cal evidence on the presence of commercial media bias within specific industries.
Section 3 presents the empirical economic literature looking at the link between
advertising and media accuracy. Section 4 introduces the theoretical framework.
Section 5 provides three main policy insights for media regulators. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Empirical evidence on commercial media bias
In this section we present the anecdotal and empirical evidence within specific adver-
tising industries where the presence of commercial media bias has been extensively
documented. Then, in the next section, we review the empirical economic literature
looking at the link between advertising and the accuracy of media reports.
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2.1 Big tobacco
The most well known and documented case of commercial media bias is represented
by the influence of tobacco companies over US media. In 1954, the American
Cancer Society released a result of a study on 187,000 men. The study showed that
cigarette smokers had a death rate from all diseases 75% higher than nonsmokers.
The mortality rate related to lung cancer was sixteen times higher with respect
to nonsmokers. Despite the overwhelming evidence on the dangerous effects of
smoking available since 1954, US media did not disclose this information for decades.
Overall, tobacco products have been causing more than 300,000 deaths per year in
the US. That is, tobacco kills every year six times more people than car accidents
(Bagdikian, 2004). The fact that tobacco companies have been major advertisers
(“the tobacco industry spends 4$ a year for every American man, woman or child”
Baker, 1994) seems to have played a key role in this cover-up. By analyzing a
sample of 99 US magazines over 25 years, Warner et al. (1992) show that magazines
that did not carry cigarette advertising were more than 40% more likely to report
news on the health consequences of smoking than those with cigarette advertising.
This difference was much more striking for women’s magazines, i.e., the magazines
not carrying tobacco ads were 230% more likely to report news on the hazards of
smoking. Kennedy and Bero (1999) performed a content analysis on newspapers and
magazine coverage of research on passive smoking. They showed that acceptance of
tobacco industry advertising was significatively associated with the conclusion that
research on passive smoking was controversial.2 It is also worthwhile to notice that,
while in 1965 the US congress passed a legislation that required cigarette packages
to be accompanied by a warning label, the very same bill prohibited the Federal
Trade Commission, state and local governments from regulating tobacco advertising
(Michaels, 2008). Indeed, as noticed by a contemporary writer “The effect of the
advertising regulation is what the cigarette industry most feared. [...] The National
Association of Broadcasters submitted statements firmly opposing any advertising
regulation” (Drew, 1965). The history of tobacco advertisers’ influence on US media
2See also Chaloupka and Warner 2000 for an extensive survey of the empirical literature on
the economics of smoking.
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contains also “retaliation” episodes. In 1957, Reader’s Digest published an article
disclosing medical evidence against tobacco. Following that article, the American
Tobacco Company successfully pressured the Digest ’s advertising agency to end
its contractual relationship with the magazine. After Mother Jones published an
article on the link between tobacco and health risks, tobacco companies reacted
by cancelling their ads (Baker, 1994). Overall, as stated by Bagdikian (2004) the
commercial media bias created by tobacco companies seems to represent “the most
shameful money-induced censorship of American news media, a corruption of news
that has contributed to millions of deaths”.
2.2 Big pharma
The medical academic community has been concerned over the influence of drug
companies on the scientific evidence presented in medical journal. A peculiar char-
acteristics of this type of media is that four out of five of the most important
North American medical journal (i.e., New England Journal of Medicine, Journal
of the American Medical Association, Annals of Internal Medicine, American Fam-
ily Physician) accept only advertisements related to medical products. This implies
that “although no policy restricted advertising only to pharmaceuticals, in practice,
drug ads dominate” (Fugh-Berman et al., 2006, page 763). In 2010, Pharmaceuti-
cal Companies spent 326$ millions for advertising in medical journals (IMS Health,
2010). In addition, drug companies finance medical journals by using “sponsor”
subscriptions (also referred as “controlled” subscriptions). That is, drug companies
pay medical journals to provide free-of-charge subscriptions to target populations.
Finally, the pharmaceutical industry also contributes to medical journals’ profits
through reprint orders (James, 2002). Thus, this symbiotic relationship between
medical journal and pharmaceutical companies seem to have provided a very fertile
ground for commercial media bias. Indeed, various scholars suggest that edito-
rial decisions in medical journals have been, sometimes, influenced by advertisers’
concerns (Fletcher, 2003; Fugh-Berman et al., 2006). Wilkes and Kravitz (1995)
provide a survey of North American journal editors showing that 12% of them noted
conflicts between advertisers’ preferences and editorial decisions. As reported by
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Fugh-Berman et al. (2006), in 1992 many large pharmaceutical companies withdrew
their ads from Annals of Medicine after that journal published a study criticizing
the accuracy of advertisements in medical journals. As stated by Robert Fletcher
“The pharmaceutical industry showed us that the advertising dollar could be a two-
edged sword, a carrot or a stick. If you ever wonder whether they play hardball,
that was a pretty good demonstration that they do” (Tsai, 2003). In a notorious
case, the executive editor of Transplantation and Dialysis, despite favorable peer
review, rejected a guest editorial questioning the efficacy of epoetin in end stage
renal disease since, as he wrote to the author, “it went beyond what our marketing
department was willing to accommodate” (Dyer, 2004). Specifically, in his letter
the editor told the author that his decision to publish the editorial was overruled
by the marketing department. The article was also suggesting that the Medicare
spending on this treatment was unjustified given the limited benefits on patients.3
2.3 The debate over anthropogenic global warming
The evidence that has been presented by US media on the sources of global warm-
ing seems to be largely unbalanced with respect to the consensus of the scientific
community (Oreskes, 2004; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2007; Oreskes and
Conway, 2010). That is, while since the mid 1990s the scientific community reached
a consensus about the anthropogenic nature of global warming (Oreskes, 2004),
media have been presenting this as a controversial issue. By analyzing the cover-
age on the causes of global warming by the major US newspapers (i.e., New York
Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal), Boykoff
and Boykoff (2004) found that the 52.6% of articles were devoting the same space
to the mainstream scientific view and to the deniers of anthropogenic global warm-
ing. A remaining 35.2% of the articles was giving more weight to the scientific
consensus while still mentioning the presence of opposite views. The 6.1% of ar-
ticle was dominated by the skeptical view. Hence, only the 5.9% of articles was
3Medicare spent over $7.6 billions on epoetin between 1991 and 2002, (Dyer, 2004). Epotein
is the main component of two similar drug products (i.e., Procrit and Epogen) produced by two
different drug companies (source: medicinenet.com/epoetin alfa).
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exclusively devoting space to the scientific consensus. In other words, as argued by
the authors, these newspapers seem to have been using “balance as bias”. Boykoff
(2007) compares the evidence on the causes of global warming presented between
2003 and 2006 by US and UK media. While the US newspapers coverage of this
issue seemed to diverge from the scientific consensus, especially between 2003 and
2004, UK newspapers do not seem to exhibit this type of divergence. As pointed
out by Ellman and Germano (2009) the conspicuous advertisements by car man-
ufactures is likely to have played an important role in inducing media to put a
disproportional weight on views against anthropogenic global warming.4
3 Empirical literature on advertising and news
contents
Over the last few years, a burgeoning empirical literature has been investigating how
advertising expenditure influences media coverage (e.g., Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2006;
Di Tella and Franceschelli, 2009; Rinallo and Basuroy, 2009; Reuters, 2009; Gam-
baro and Puglisi, 2010). While this literature usually finds a positive correlation
between advertising expenditure and favorable media coverage, the evidence is not
always univocal. Specifically, the correlation between ads expenditure and favorable
news becomes less significant, or even disappears, in contexts where the competi-
tion of advertisers over news contents is higher. For example, Reuter and Zitzewitz
(2006) find a positive relation between mutual fund recommendation and adver-
tising expenditures for personal finance media (i.e., Money Magazine, Kiplinger’s
Personal Finance and SmartMoney) while no correlation for national newspapers
(i.e., the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal). Rinallo and Basuroy
(2009) construct a dataset covering 291 Italian fashion firms and then analyze the
relationship between their advertising expenditure and the coverage of their prod-
ucts in newspapers and magazines in Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The authors find that preferential coverage of the adver-
4In the US, Automotive advertising summed up to $19.8 billions just in 2006 (Ellman and
Germano, 2009).
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tisers’ products is weaker when the media outlet’s advertising revenues are more
diversified. Reuter (2009) finds weak evidence on the correlation between wines’
ratings and advertising in Wine Spectator.
Similarly, the literature looking at the effect of advertising on media accuracy from a
historical perspective shows that advertising may also play a positive role. Gentzkow
et al. (2006) investigate this issue by focusing on the US newspaper industry be-
tween the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Technolog-
ical changes, such as a decreasing production costs, created significative economies
of scale and then increased the competitiveness of the newspaper industry. As a
consequence, these technological changes increased advertising revenues contribut-
ing to the creation of a politically independent press in the US. Petrova (2010) looks
at the US press in the 1880s and shows that a higher profitability of advertising
in local markets was conducive to the presence of more independent newspapers.
Poitras and Sutter (2009) empirically investigate the decline in muckraking by US
magazines at the beginning of the 20th century. The authors show that there is
no evidence in support of the hypothesis that such decline was the consequence of
advertisers’ boycott as a reaction for adverse news coverage.
4 Theoretical framework
The previous section presented anecdotal and empirical evidence on the presence
of commercial media bias within specific industries. At the same time, we reviewed
the mixed empirical evidence arising from the economic literature on the effects of
advertising on media accuracy. In this section, we present a theoretical framework
that allows to reconcile this mixed evidence. Specifically, we construct a simple
model which summarizes the main elements of the theoretical literature on com-
mercial media bias (Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2010; Blasco,
Pin and Sobbrio, 2011).
There are two firms i = g, b each producing a product at zero marginal costs.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the relevant case where one firm has a
bad quality product (e.g., a defective product) while the other is producing a good
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quality one. There is a unit mass of potential consumers and a media outlet. The
two firms and the media outlet know the quality of the products while consumers
do not. Specifically, consumers rely on the media outlet to gather information on
products’ qualities. Moreover, information is hard (it could be concealed but not
forged). Thus the media outlet has to choose whether to reveal to consumers that
firm b has a bad quality product or to conceal such information.
There are two periods. In each period, the media outlet may reach a unit mass of
readers. However, when it hides some information in the first period, the number of
readers in the second period drops to θ < 1. That is, in the second period readers
will perceive the media outlet as less informative. We denote by Πˆi and ψˆi the
profits of firm i and the ads fee paid by firm i, respectively, when the media outlet
makes a truthful news report (i.e., discloses the bad news on firm b’s product).
Viceversa, we denote by Πi and ψi the profits of firm i and the ads fee paid by
firm i, respectively, when the media outlet hides the bad news on firm b’s product.
Hence, the profits of firm b when the media outlet conceals the negative news on
its product are:
Πb = pi · [α(1 + θ)]− ψb (1)
where pi > 0 denotes the mark-up when both firms are active in the market and
α ≤ 1 denotes the exogenous fraction of consumers out of the unit mass of readers.
When bad news are revealed, no reader would buy the product of firm b and so,
its profits would simply be Πˆb = 0. Thus, firm b would never be willing to pay
any positive ads fees when the media outlet discloses such bad news, i.e., ψˆb = 0.
Hence, the maximum ads fee that firm b is willing to pay to the media outlet, in
exchange of hiding the bad news on its products, is:
ψmaxb = pi · α(1 + θ) (2)
Indeed, clearly, firm b would rather have the media outlet disclosing the bad news
on its product, and then earn zero profits, rather than paying any ψb > ψ
max
b .
On the other hand, the good producer (i.e., firm g) would never be willing to pay any
ads fee when the media outlet hides the negative information on firm b’s product,
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i.e., ψg = 0. Moreover, if the media outlet were to hide the bad news on firm b’s
product, the profits of firm g would be
Πg = pi · [α(1 + θ)] = Πb + ψb (3)
Instead, when the media outlet reveals the bad information on firm b’s product:
Πˆg = p¯i · 2α− ψˆg (4)
where p¯i > pi denotes the mark-up that firm g could obtain when it is not facing
the competition of firm b. Clearly, since p¯i > pi and θ < 1, the profits of the good
producer, gross of the ads fee, will always be higher when the media outlet discloses
the bad news to consumers. Hence, the maximum ads fee that firm g would be
willing to pay to the media outlet in exchange of disclosing the bad news on its
rival’s product is ψˆmaxg such that Πˆg = Πg. That is:
ψˆmaxg = α [p¯i · 2− pi · (1 + θ)]
The media outlet. We denote by Γ the media outlet’s profits when it hides the
negative news on firm b’s product. That is:
Γ = s · (1 + θ) + ψb
where s > 0 represents the subscription fees obtained from the readers. That is,
the media outlet acts as a platform of a two sided market. Its profits depend both
on its revenues in the market for readers and the ones in the market for advertisers.
On the other hand, the media outlet’s profits when reporting the bad news on firm
b’s product, are:
Γˆ = s · 2 + ψˆg
Hence, if the media outlet were not to receive any payment (i.e., ads fee) from firm
b, it would always prefer to produce truthful news reports (i.e., reputation effect).
Now suppose that firm g and b compete to influence the media outlet’s decision on
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whether to report the bad news on firm b’s product or not. Specifically, as discussed
above, the maximum firm b may be willing to pay to the media outlet in order to
hide the bad news on its product is ψmaxb . Hence, the good quality producer will
always be able to match firm b’s offer as long as ψˆmaxg ≥ ψmaxb . Specifically, the
maximum willingness to pay of the good quality firm is higher than the one of the
bad quality one, if and only if:
p¯i ≥ pi(1 + θ) (5)
Thus, whenever p¯i ≥ 2pi the above condition is always verified. Moreover, from the
media outlet perspective, it will always be optimal to be paid by the good quality
firm to disclose the bad news on firm b rather than being paid the latter to hide
such bad news, if and only if:
s · (1− θ) ≥ ψb − ψˆg
That is, a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the media outlet has an
incentive to disclose the bad information on firm b’s product will be:
s · (1− θ) ≥ 2α [pi(1 + θ)− p¯i] (6)
Thus, (5) is a sufficient condition for the above being satisfied. That is, the media
outlet will always be induced to disclose its information to readers when the gain of
firm g in the mark-up from driving out of the market its competitor is sufficiently
large (i.e., profit maximization effect). Moreover, immediate comparative statics
point out that the higher are the media outlet’s profits in the market for readers
(i.e., the higher are the subscription fees s), and the higher the reputation cost
when not disclosing bad news (i.e., the lower is θ), the more likely that the media
outlet will end up revealing all its information to consumers. Viceversa, the higher
is the fraction of readers who are also potential consumers (i.e., the higher is α),
the higher the media outlet’s incentives to hide information (when p¯i < pi(1 + θ)).
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4.1 Correlation and competition in the market for products
In this section, we extend the theoretical framework described above by considering
a situation where the quality of firms’ products is correlated. Specifically, when
the media outlet reports the bad news on firm b’s product, the fraction of readers
buying firm g’s product (i.e., α) is reduced by a factor (1− ρ) with respect to the
uncorrelated case. That is, ρ is a parameter capturing the degree of correlation
between products. Hence, when the correlation is sufficiently high, firm g has no
longer incentives to pay the media outlet to reveal the bad news on firm b’s product.
Specifically, the correlation between products’ qualities negatively affects the value
of driving out of the market firm b since, from the readers perspective, bad news
on firm b’s product are (partly) also bad news on firm g’s product.5 Hence, the
maximum ads fee the good producer is willing to pay to the media outlet becomes:
ψˆmaxg = α [p¯i · 2(1− ρ)− pi(1 + θ)]
That is, when correlation increases ψˆmaxg decreases, up to the point where the above
threshold becomes negative. Moreover, ψˆmaxg is always lower than the maximum
willingness to pay of firm g discussed in the previous section. Therefore, in presence
of correlation between products’ qualities, the media outlet will have less incentives
to disclose the negative news on firm b’s product and it will do so only when it
could obtain sufficiently high subscription fees from its readers.6
Indeed, when subscription fees are zero s = 0 (i.e., purely advertising funded media
outlet), the media outlet will disclose such bad news if and only if:
ρ ≤ ρ¯ ≡ 1− pi
p¯i
· (1 + θ) (7)
That is, in advertising industries characterized by highly correlated products, firms
5It is here, implicitly, assumed that the media outlet observes the quality of firm b while it
gets only a noisy signal on firm g’s product (which is correlated with the quality of firm b’s
product). Hence, the higher the correlation between products, the more bad news on product b
are (relatively) also bad news on product g.
6Notice that, we are here implictly assuming that the media outlet’s readership does not depend
on products’ correlation. More generally, since correlation affects the accuracy of the media outlet’s
news reports, readership would endogenously depend on it (see Blasco, Pin and Sobbrio, 2011)
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end up sharing similar preferences over news content. Hence, consistent with the
anecdotal and empirical evidence presented in section 2 on the tobacco, pharma-
ceutical and automotive industries, in this case the media outlet may be induced by
advertisers to not produce accurate news reports. Instead, when products qualities
are weakly correlated, firms have conflicting preferences over news reports. Then,
in this case, the media outlet is more likely to have the proper incentives to deliver
accurate news reports (consistent with the empirical evidence discussed in section
3).
On the other hand, more competition in the market for products may be detrimental
to the accuracy of the media outlet’s report. Indeed, when the products market
becomes more competitive the gain in the mark-up from excluding one rival from
the market, i.e., (p¯i − pi), decreases. Hence, the ratio pi/p¯i increases. Therefore, a
higher degree of competition in the market for products does not necessarily lead to
a higher accuracy of the media outlet’s reports. Moreover, the higher is the degree
of correlation among products’ qualities, the more likely it is that this competition
effect is detrimental for accuracy. That is, the higher is ρ, the lower pi/p¯i must be to
ensure that the media outlet has an incentive to produce an accurate news report.
4.2 Competition in the market for news
In this section we extend the framework described in section 4 to allow for the
presence of two media outlets competing in the market for news. Specifically, we
assume that there is an incumbent media outlet and an entrant one. The two
media outlets are horizontally differentiated. Hence, readers can access the news
reports from both media outlets but have to incur in a transportation cost to move
from a media outlet to the other (as in Germano and Meier, 2010). Specifically, we
capture the presence of competition between the two media outlets and the presence
of readers’ transportation cost, by assuming that the incumbent media outlet will
charge a subscription fee s < s to the unit mass of readers and, upon not observing
any news on firms’ products, only a fraction 1 −  > 0 of them will get informed
also from the entrant media outlet. That is,  ∈ (0, 1] represents a proxy of the
transportation cost. Moreover, without loss of generality, the entrant media outlet
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is assumed to be purely subscription funded (i.e., advertisers cannot influence its
news reports and thus it will always disclose the bad news on firm b’s product).7
Thus, even if the entrant media outlet does not directly compete in the adverting
market with the incumbent, it will still negatively affect the advertising revenues of
the incumbent media outlet by indirectly decreasing the value of its reports from
the advertisers’ perspective (i.e., the value of hiding/disclosing the bad news on
firm b’s product). That is, when the incumbent media outlet conceals the negative
news on firm b’s product, firm b’s profits are:
Πb =  · α · pi(1 + θ)− ψb
Therefore, the maximum ads fee that firm b is willing to pay to the incumbent
media outlet, in exchange of hiding the bad news on its products, becomes:
ψmaxb =  · α · pi(1 + θ) (8)
Hence, ψmaxb is lower than the one derived in the single media outlet case, and it is
increasing in the transportation costs .
As before, the good producer (i.e., firm g) would never be willing to pay any ads
fee to the incumbent media outlet when it hides the negative information on firm
b’s product, i.e., ψg = 0. On the other hand, regardless of the news report of the
incumbent media outlet, firm g knows that a fraction α(1 − ) of readers would
anyway learn that firm b’s product is a bad quality one. That is, a fraction α(1− )
of readers would always buy its products. Thus, firm g will always earn a mark-up
p¯i from at least a fraction α(1− ) of readers.8 Hence, if the incumbent media outlet
7Alternatively, this assumption may simply reflect the fact that the entrant media outlet must
build its reputation for accurate news reporting.
8Notice that, here we are implicitly assuming, without loss of generality, that firm g can
perfectly price discriminate between the (1− ) readers who learn from the entrant media outlet
that firm b has a bad quality product, and the other  readers who do not. Indeed, alternatively,
equation (10) may be expressed as:
Πg =  [pi · α(1 + θ)] + (1− ) [(pi + η) · 2α] (9)
where η ∈ [0, p¯i − pi] denotes different levels of price discrimination. That is, the case of perfect
price discrimination is captured by η = p¯i − pi. Instead, when η = 0 firm g is not able to price
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were to hide the bad news on firm b’s product, the profits of firm g would be:
Πg =  [pi · α(1 + θ)] + (1− ) [p¯i · 2α] (10)
Instead, when the media outlet reveals the bad information on firm b’s product:
Πˆg = [p¯i · 2α]− ψˆg (11)
hence
ψˆmaxg =  · α[2p¯i − pi(1 + θ)] (12)
Hence, also ψˆmaxg is lower than the one derived in the single media outlet case and
it is increasing in the transportation costs . Therefore, by denoting s˜ = s/, the
incumbent media outlet will report accurate information to its readers if and only
if:
s˜(1− θ) ≥ 2α[pi(1 + θ)− p¯i] (13)
Thus, in order to compare whether the incumbent media outlet’s incentives to
produce accurate news reports increase or decrease when it faces the competition
of the entrant, it is sufficient to compare s˜ with s. It is immediate to verify that
when all readers are willing to watch the entrant media outlet, upon not observing
any bad news from the incumbent, i.e.,  → 0, then the media outlet could not
gain anything from advertisers. Hence, it will always report accurate information
to consumers, i.e., for every s ∈ (0, s]. Viceversa, when only a small fraction of
readers is willing to watch the entrant’s news reports, the above condition is less
likely to be satisfied. That is, when the readers’ transportation cost is high, the
decrease in the subscription fees due to the entrant competition may result in the
incumbent media outlet being more likely to not report accurate information due to
the advertising pressure from firm b. In other words, when the readers transportation
cost is low, the presence of an additional media outlet is likely to be beneficial for
discriminate. In this case, equation (12) would become:
ψˆmaxg = α[2p¯i − pi(2− (1− θ))]
16
readers. When the transportation cost is high, this may not be the case.
To make this point explicit, let’s look at what happens if the transportation cost 
depends directly on the number of competing media outlets in the market. Suppose
that there are n entrant media outlets. For simplicity, as before, we assume that
these n media outlets do not directly compete in ads fees with the incumbent.
Thus, the only direct effect of increasing competition in the market for news on
the incumbent’s profits is given by a decrease in the readers’ transportation cost
(which now depends on the number of entrants). Specifically, we can assume that
(n) ≡ n. That is, transaction costs are strictly decreasing in the number of entrants
(see Germano and Meier 2010). Thus, by substituting this function into (13), we can
characterize a threshold in the number of media outlets competing in the market for
news, above which the news reports of the incumbent are accurate (no commercial
media bias). Specifically:
n¯ =
log(2α) + log(pi(1 + θ)− p¯i)− log(s(1− θ))
log()
(14)
In other words, whenever n > n¯, the transportation cost that each reader has to
incur in order to watch one of the entrant media outlet will be small enough to
ensure that the incumbent media outlet will have an incentive to produce accurate
news reports.
5 Regulatory implications
In this section, we discuss the implications for media regulators arising from the
theoretical framework described in the previous section. Specifically, the results
of the model imply that media regulators should look at three different aspects
when trying to address commercial media bias: the degree of correlation among the
products of potential advertisers within a given industry, the degree of competition
of potential advertisers in that industry, the degree of competition in the market
for news. As discussed above, commercial media bias is more likely to arise in
presence of advertisers whose products belong to industries exhibiting a high degree
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of correlation. Indeed, when advertisers’ products are highly correlated they will
end up sharing the same preferences over news reports. That is, both the good
quality (firm g) and bad quality (firm b) producers will prefer the media to hide
any negative news on products’ qualities (as in the case of tobacco companies).
Instead, in industries where products are weakly correlated, potential advertisers
have conflicting preferences over news reports. Hence, the competition between
good and bad quality producers over news reports ends up creating the proper
incentives for media to deliver accurate news reports. That is, the effect of products
correlation on the accuracy of news reports leads to the first policy insight for media
regulators.
Policy insight 1 Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards
news contents/issues upon which advertisers are likely to share similar pref-
erences.
Therefore, when potential advertisers have conflicting preferences over news reports,
the virtuous effect of competition would prevent commercial media bias to arise
in the first place. Instead, when potential advertisers share the same preferences
over news reports, commercial media bias is likely to represent a serious concern.
Hence, media regulators should allocate their monitoring efforts towards advertising
industries where firms are more likely to have positively correlated preferences over
news reports.
Moreover, when advertisers share similar preferences over news reports, an increase
in the degree of products market competition may not be beneficial for the accuracy
of news reports. This leads to the second policy insight for media regulators.
Policy insight 2 In industries characterized by highly correlated products quali-
ties, an increase in the degree of competition in the market for products may
translate into a lower accuracy of news reports
Indeed, when ρ = 0, an increase in the competitiveness of the industry such that
p¯i ∼= pi → 0, translates in the media outlet always producing accurate news reports
(condition (6) is always verified). Instead, the higher is ρ, the more likely that a
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higher degree of competition in the products market ends up weakening the media
outlet’s incentives to report accurate information (less likely that (7) is verified).
Finally, when advertisers have highly correlated preferences over news reports, a
significant level of competition in the market for news may help counterbalancing
the incentives to bias the news coverage in favor of advertisers. This represents the
third policy insight for media regulators.
Policy insight 3 A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news
drives out the commercial media bias that would otherwise arise in presence
of news contents/issues upon which advertisers share similar preferences.
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that the efforts and the policy instruments used
by media regulators should vary according to the characteristics of the advertisers’
industry.
6 Conclusions
As pointed out by Ellman and Germano (2009), there are two scholarly views re-
garding the role of advertising on the accuracy of media reports. On one side,
the “regulatory” view emphasizes the danger of distortions arising from advertisers
pressure over media to deliver favorable news reports (e.g., Baker, 1994; Bagdikian,
2004). The anecdotal and empirical evidence on Tobacco, Pharmaceutical and
Automotive industries, reviewed in section 2, seems indeed to substantiate these
concerns. On the other hand, the “liberal” view emphasizes the positive role of ad-
vertising in creating and maintaining a politically independent press (e.g., Kaplan,
2002; Gentzkow et al., 2006). The historical evidence presented in section 3 seems,
indeed, consistent with this alternative view. More generally, the recent empiri-
cal literature looking at the link between advertising and accuracy of media reports
seems to provide mixed evidence on this issue (as pointed out in section 3). This pa-
per provides a theoretical framework which allows to reconcile this mixed evidence.
Specifically, we have constructed a simple model summarizing the main features of
the theoretical literature on commercial media bias (Ellman and Germano, 2009;
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Germano and Meier, 2010; Blasco, Pin and Sobbrio, 2011). The theoretical analysis
emphasizes that the efforts and the policy instruments used by media regulators in
addressing commercial media bias should vary according to the characteristics of
the advertisers’ industry. Specifically, the results of the model deliver three main
policy insights for media regulators:
1. Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news con-
tents/issues upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences.
2. In advertising industries characterized by highly correlated products, an in-
crease in the degree of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of
news reports.
3. A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news may drive
out commercial media bias.
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